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I. Introduction
The mainspring of an economy's growth and take-off continues to puzzle econo though, thanks to years of sustained research, many of the pieces of the jigsaw place, it remains very difficult to predict when an economy that has floundere might suddenly take off. The economy, embedded as it is in politics, culture, and i is a sufficiently complex organism for this not to be surprising. However, gro beget growth, though, of course, missteps can bring it to a halt. Hence, our und an economy's rapid growth has to focus largely on what causes the first stirring What this paper attempts is to anal has determined the growth performa hibernation and sudden, recent show of get the facts right. Over the last 4 or before, since its independence in 1947 growing faster, when did the take-off idle curiosity but to understand the var that in turn is important for the craft more evenly across the population.
Section II of the paper presents the economy since independence and also It then goes on to discuss the broad statistics pertaining to India, includi of the on-going debate on the compo of the different policies in the 1980 identifying the landmark years, and and the extent to which they helped critical microeconomic component of followed by some concluding remarks
II. Growth: trends and pa (i) Backdrop
Thanks to a long history of data collection, the basic numbers of the Indian economy are, for poor country, well documented. At the time of its independence in 1947, India had: a litera rate of 18 per cent; an investment rate of around 9 per cent of its GDP; life expectancy at bir of 32 years; an annual population growth rate of 1.25 per cent; and an average annual grow rate of GDP of around 3 per cent. In 2005/6, India had: a literacy rate of around 60 per cen an investment rate of around 30 per cent of its GDP; life expectancy at birth of 63 years;
annual population growth rate of 1.5 per cent; and an annual growth rate of GDP of aroun To get a basic idea of the absolute numbers involved, Table 2 gives the size of the Indian population, the real GDP (at market prices), and the real GDP per capita (at market prices). The key difference between the GDP at factor costs and the GDP at market prices is that the latter includes indirect taxes net of subsidies. As the latter is considered a better measure of the standard of living, we have opted to report the absolute figures of the GDP and GDP per capita at market prices.
From Table 2 it is clear that while the Indian population has more than doubled since the 1960s, GDP has increased more than eightfold since then. As the population figures for India are based on projections from Census of India data,3 we have opted not to show the entire time series for population or GDP per capita.
To conclude this introduction, let us ask one more factual question: how has India done vis-á-vis other nations, especially other developing countries? Has it really done better or is it simply the fact of a large country beginning to grow that has caught the media's attention and imagination?
In order to answer this question we assembled the purchasing power parity (PPP)-corrected national income and per-capita national income data of the World Bank for 109 countries.4 There was a trade-off involved. As one goes further back, data, especially when we want T CD CD to revert back to 3.5 per cent per annum, almost as if this magic figure was w possibility of Hinduism having something to do with economic growth was ear 3 The first census of India was carried out throughout the 1860s and complet been 13 more censuses, one per decade, the latest one being the 2001 census.
4 The PPP-corrected GDP takes into account the difference in prices of goo
As the exchange rate only takes into account the differences in tradable goods have non-market-based exchange-rate determination, it is arguable that the PPP comparisons of standards of living across countries. In terms of GDP ranking the improvement has also been marked, though this is tempered by the fact that some of the poorer economies have had a faster growth of population, especially over the last two decades. In 1985, India's PPP-corrected GDP was the 8th largest in the world, and by 2004 it was the fourth largest, with only the USA, China, and Japan ahead.5
Despite this rank improvement, India and South Asia in general are still among the poorest regions in the world (see Table 3 ). Indeed, a quick look at one of the most important development indicators, the population below the poverty line, shows us that despite the decline in poverty headcount ratio, from 55 per cent in 1973/4 to 29 per cent in 1998/9, India still accounts for a large absolute number of poor people, close to 30 m in 2000.6 This change in India's growth rate and improved economic performance vis-ä-vis other nations triggered off a change in global perception not just in academic writing, but in the (Table 172) and National Sample Survey (NSS) 55th Round Official Estimates. Note that the measurement of poverty has been a hotly debated subject especially since the 55th round of the NSS tried to change the reference period of household consumption (see Deaton and Dréze, 2002; Himanshu and Sen, 2005; Lancaster and Ray, 2005; ch. 10). (ii) Growth patterns and hypotheses
Turning to details of the growth performance, let us take another look at the growth rate of the GDP in Figure 2 and 1957 /8, 1965 /6, 1972 /3, and 1979 /80. Since 1980 never has the economy, as measured by GDP, shrunk in any year, though per-capita GDP fell once-during 1990/1-owing to the First Gulf War and a sharp decline in remittances and exports. GDP grew slowly that year but by less than the population growth.
Owing to the huge amount of noise, the trends are not too evident to the naked eye. But once we smooth out these annual fluctuations and look, instead, at averages of several years of growth (see Table 1 ), a pattern emerges. The average growth holds steady till about the mid-1970s and then, somewhere after that, it begins to move up, and that upward incline has persisted till current times. This is corroborated by the average, annual growth-rate figures for each of the 5-year plan periods. Average annual growth nearly touched the 5 per cent mark during the Fifth Plan period, 1974-9, and has never dropped below that since. The sharp spike occurred during the Eighth Plan period, 1992-7, when annual growth averaged 6.7 per cent. All the portents are that, during the Tenth Plan period, the economy will grow at close to 8 per cent per annum. Given that India's population growth rate is much slower than it used to be three or four decades ago (1. Figure 2: Growth rate of GDP in India, 1950 India, -2006 Source: Table 1. 1971/28) this means that the rise in per-capita income growth rate from the 1960s and to current times has been even more marked.
More formal evidence that the GDP growth series exhibits a structural break at the end of the 1970s/beginning of the 1980s can be found in Virmani (1997 Virmani ( , 2004a , Wallack (2003) , Rodrik and Subramanian (20046) , and Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2006) . The last, for instance, use a regression-based least-squares approach that does not arbitrarily partition the data according to pre-selected break points and identify 1978/9 as a structural break year for the GDP growth series. These authors challenged the standard view held in the 1990s by the public and a large majority of economists that the policy reforms of the early 1990s had caused or played a major role in the growth acceleration (views held by, for instance, Ahluwalia (2002) and Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2003) ). A new view emerged, led by Williamson and Zagha (2002), De Long (2003) , Rodrik and Subramanian (2004a ,6) , Panagariya (2004) , and Virmani (2004a) , that the surge in growth rate in India happened around 1980 and could therefore not be attributed entirely to the new economic policies of the early 1990s.
While it is difficult to dispute that a rise in growth rate took place before the 1990s, it is possible to argue that there was further acceleration after the reforms of the 1990s, which can be attributed to those reforms. Further, we are inclined to argue-as, indeed, some others have done-that the growth in the 1980s was not of a sustainable nature, since it relied too much on deficit financing and excessive foreign borrowing (Basu, 2004; Panagariya, 2004; Srinivasan, 2005) .
To understand this debate and the components of the post-1980s growth further, let us take a look at the results of the growth accounting exercise of Bosworth et al. (2007) . The objective of growth accounting is to decompose the economic growth rate of a country into contributions of different factors. Assuming a certain aggregate production function and competitive markets, the method identifies the contribution of the different factors (such as labour and physical capital) and a residual, called total factor productivity (TFP).9 Changes in the TFP represent changes in efficiency and/or changes in production technology. Table 4 shows the results of this exercise. Table 4 shows that the pre-1980 growth is mainly associated with an increase in factors while the post-1980 growth is associated with some increase in factors, but more importantly an increase in TFP.10 Looking at the entire time series, they conclude that the TFP growth took off around the early 1980s, and has shown an increasing trend since then. This finding is consistent with other studies on TFP growth (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004b; Virmani, 2004b) . Despite the large structural change in the economy (see Table 5 ), this increase in TFP, according to these authors, mainly reflects an improvement of the performance of the individual sectors rather than a re-allocation of resources from low-productivity sectors (agriculture) to higher productivity sectors (manufacturing and services But how did this sudden surge in TFP come about? Rodrik a suggest that even though the reforms of the 1980s, which consi liberalization measures, lowering of tax rates, and limited impor substantial, this small trigger could have elicited a large resp was below its production possibility frontier. The increases in TFP be a reflection of the move towards the frontier rather than a shi
As a whole, they see an attitudinal shift towards 'pro-business' p 'pro-market' policies of the 1990s) as crucial in explaining the surg rate and TFP. owe something to the steady expansion in irrigated area in the de the mid-sixties'.14 Indeed, given the significance of agriculture 1950s-1980s, it seems that a good or a bad year in terms of rains on the overall growth rate. Consider, for example, the GDP growt 1958/9,1967/8, and 1988/9 in Table 6 . Virmani (2004a) , however, c wisdom and argues that there has been no change in the impact of ra Indian economy during the last 50 years. As far as TFP is concern show that, taking 1960 as the index year (1960 = 1), the growth sector fluctuates around the index 1 up to the mid-to late 1980s, trend can be discerned. In figures, they find that the TFP growth ch per year during the period 1960-73, to 0.9 per cent per year durin cent during 1983-99. Despite the fact that the growth figures of the last few years d different from the growth figures of the previous decades, there in India. This is caused by the declining public investments in ag started in the early 1980s), the decline in agriculture as a share of relatively little reallocation of employment (the primary sector cont GDP but has a share of 60 per cent of the employment), the fac a predominantly rural phenomenon, and the rise in farmer suicid Kamataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra (Vaidyanathan, 2006 12 The reforms of the 1980s are extensively discussed by, among others, Koh Panagariya (2004) .
13 Rodrik and Subramanian (20046) provide evidence for this attitudinal shift by 1980s that favoured the interests of existing businesses rather than new entrants been contested by Srinivasan (2005) .
14 The current gross irrigated area is 40 per cent of the cultivated area. This area has 40 years (see Ministry of Agriculture, 2004, Table 14 .2). Turning to industry, let us first look at the industry figures in column 2 of Tables 5 and 6. The share of the industrial sector has increased over the last 50 years from 13 per cent at the time of independence to 24 per cent. As such, the structure of the economy of India is nowadays of a very different nature from that of China, where industry represents nearly 50 per cent of the economy. The time series in column 2, Table 6 , which seems at first sight quite volatile, has an (arithmetic) average of approximately 6 per cent and a standard deviation of 2.9 per cent. According to Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2006) , the manufacturing series exhibits three structural breaks. The first negative structural break is in the mid-1960s. The second positive structural break is in 1982/3, and the third negative structural break is in 1994/5. They interpret these figures as evidence against the hypothesis that manufacturing led the acceleration in the GDP growth rate at the beginning of the 1980s. Virmani (2004a) , however, comes to the exact opposite conclusion: 'this [analysis] shows that the growth rate of manufacturing accelerated after 1980-81. This contributed to the acceleration of the rate of growth of GDP from 1981.' And the debate does not end there. According to Bosworth et al. (2007) , the TFP growth of industry has been slowing down, not accelerating, during the post-reform period. They conclude that 'these results are disappointing in light of the attention that has been devoted to the on-going liberalization of the trade and regulatory regimes for goods production'. Their conclusions related to manufacturing are very similar to those for industry as a whole. They, among others, thereby provide counter-evidence to the studies of Ahluwalia (1995) and Unel (2003) , who concluded that manufacturing experienced a surge of productivity in the 1980s. Goldar and Mitra (2002) take the more sceptical line that these differences in findings can be attributed to a variety of measurement issues.
Finally, let us take a look at the servic and 6. Tableó shows that, since the higher annual growth rate than the i Bosworth et al. (2007) show that, accor in growth rate is mainly due to an i normally considered as an area of lim explanations for this phenomenon, s industry. Srinivasan (2005) Table 7 , one can see that India ranks relatively high in the 'getting credit' and 'protecting investors' spheres, but particularly low in the areas of 'dealing with licences', 'paying taxes', and 'enforcing contracts'. In these areas, as well as in the areas of 'employing workers' and 'closing a business', most analysts would agree that further reforms are needed.
The 'dealing with licences' indicator is of particular interest in the Indian case as it is often viewed as a residue of the Licence Raj that characterized India before the 1980s (Aghion etal., 2006) .17 According to the World Bank figures, India has not improved much over the last 2 years. In India one needs on average 270 days to complete all the procedures required to build a standardized warehouse in the construction industry; this is considerably higher than the average of the low-income countries (231 days). India's cost measure of this indicator gives a slightly more optimistic picture. Obtaining the necessary licences to build the warehouse costs 606 per cent of the GNI per capita, which is in between the averages of the low-income countries (996 per cent) and the lower-middle-income countries (558 per cent). involved. In addition, the rankings do not take into account that the opportunity cost of time differs across countries; one day waiting in India is not the same as one day waiting in the USA. On a similar note, as the gross national income (GNI) is much higher in the high-income countries, a low cost as a percentage of the GNI is in a way 'easier' to achieve; also, as this cost is not calculated as a percentage of the PPP GNI, the actual perceived costs in developing countries might be lower than is suggested by the World Bank figures. It is unclear how these data issues affect the relative ranking of the countries.
17 Some first-hand descriptive accounts of India's burgeoning bureaucracy occur in Basu (20076 In their analysis they used settler mortal major languages of Western Europe, or f instrument for institutions, as described
III. The political economy of
The previous section gave an overview of and briefly outlined the elements of the This section tells the story behind the num
The first real big growth year for India, 1 of the most salient, if not notorious, year by 9 per cent, a figure that has been surp which the then Prime Minister, Indira Ga dictatorial control over the nation. This w an election. There is no way of knowing popularity on her part or because of a gen the fact of the matter is that she was r (re-elected) only in 1980.
Some of the growth spurt of the early E worst-performing year in the history of nevertheless to be the cross-over plan per the 5 per cent mark.
Thanks to the totalitarian embarrassmen to identify that year as a break in the t that it was, even though the sustainabilit next improvement would come in the ear up further but, as pointed out above, the change, which in our opinion was the larg a structural break, occurred in 1991, whe (Shetty, 2007) . Table 8 shows that there w increase in the number of bank branches in India, following the prima-facie evidence for this hypothesis is, indeed, there.
The opening of branches and making savings and borrowing ou citizens were explicit objectives of the nationalization.24 And wh awaits formal investigation, there are other kinds of related stu nationalization of banks had a large impact on ordinary citize (2005) , for instance, test whether this large state-led bank-branch associated with poverty reduction in India, given that an integral was branch expansion into rural locations without banks. The pa branch expansion into such rural locations in India significantly 21 Why the Indian reforms came so late, and only when the nation was up against question. It may have something to do with India's democracy, which is quite uniq democratic nations adopted democracy with universal suffrage, after the process o place. India adopted universal suffrage at independence, at a level of poverty with to contend with the opinion of the poor in ways that are quite alien to the industri 2007). This may also have something to do with the tenacity of India's labour laws 22 See Majumdar (1997) for discussion of growth theory in the context of the Ind 23 The Supreme Court of India initially declared the nationalization to be invalid. law and passed the nationalization decision by an ordinance.
24 'The banking system touches the lives of millions and has to be inspired by la subserve national priorities and objectives such as rapid growth of agriculture, sma of employment levels, encouragement of new entrepreneurs and development of b is necessary for the government to take direct responsibility for the extension and di and for the working of a substantial part of the banking system.' (Bank Company 25 Economic analysis of banking reform is a relatively scarce discipline in India.
etal. (2003, 2004) . Real interest rate -4.9 5.9 3.9 6.8 5.2 9.4 5.9
Note: The nominal lending rate is an average of the rates for four major lending institutions. The infla is measured by the annual rate of change in the wholesale price index for all commodities.
Source: Bosworth et al. (2007, Table 12) seems natural to expect that such a large banking initiative did cause a boost in sa especially since it coincided with the rise in India's savings rate.
Another reason for the increasing savings rate could be the increasing real intere (Table 9) . These are positive and show an increasing trend since 1974. Yet, most de studies of savings find a rather weak connection between interest rates and savin 2007; Shome, 2007) , suggesting that consumers are more interested in long-run pr and the facilities for saving than the immediate lure of interest. As Shome (2007, remarks, ' But it is clearly the growth in financial intermediation that stands out mo main driver of savings.'
Let us look at some statistics on the growth of savings in India. Bosworth et al. report that not only have national savings risen considerably since the 1980s, but particular, household savings have risen from 10 to 25 per cent of GDP during th 30 years. Half of this is in the form of financial savings, which can be channelled b other sectors as investment. Public-sector saving, however, has not performed as w a high of around 4 per cent in the 1970s, it became negative in the late 1990s, rec only recently. These trends are noted in Figure 3 . Note that savings are reported percentage of GNP at factor costs. It is also important to note that savings ha Year 1970 Year -4 1975 Year -9 1980 Year -4 1985 Year -9 1990 Year -4 1995 Year -9 2000 Nominal lending rate 9.0 10.4 13.3 13.9 16.7 15.2 11.4
Inflation rate 15.3 4.7 9.3 6.7 11 5.3 5.2
Real interest rate -4.9 5.9 3.9 6.8 5.2 9.4 5.9 particularly in the post-liberalization years. Whether there is a link between higher savings and post-liberalization policies needs to be further researched.
To conclude, the rise in India's savings rate deserves more detailed investigation than has occurred thus far. Given that India is currently in the midst of another sharp rise in savings (the first since the late 1970s), this is a subject of contemporary relevance.
The second acceleration-in the early 1980s--probably owes something to altered policies, and, of course, it came with a background of higher investment and savings rates. The change in policy regime makes for interesting political sleuthing. It seems to have much to do with Indira Gandhi's altered perceptions. The reading of descriptive accounts of her regime (for instance, Dhar, 2000; Frank 2002) suggests that unlike her father, Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi never had strong convictions about economic policy. Her early commitment to 'socialism' was arguably prompted by an instinctive following of her father's convictions and policies, without any deep convictions of her own. She nationalized banks and established control over grain trade as homage to her father without a coherent plan for the whole economy as such.
By the mid-1970s she was under the influence of another man-her younger son, Sanjay Gandhi. Sanjay was not committed to any well-thought-out ideology, but was wary of Congress socialism. What was notable about him was his vaulting ambition and, along with his entrepreneurial friends, he pushed India towards crony capitalism. Much has been written about his disproportionate influence on his mother. In an interview that he gave in July 1976, he openly criticized the Communist Party of India (an ally of Indira Gandhi) and disparaged earlier policies of the Congress. Mrs Gandhi was upset by the interview and summoned P. N. Dhar, who headed her secretariat, and told him, 'Sanjay has done something terrible and I am upset' (Dhar, 2000, p. 325 ). The conversation that followed, where she asked Dhar to do the damage control, suggested to him that she was 'afraid' of Sanjay's 'displeasure'. As time progressed and she felt more and more isolated from her own party and other politicians, there is more to the story, especially over with politics, this time global politics.
26 Sanjay Gandhi died when a plane that he was f 27 See, for instance, Desai (1994) , Srinivasan Chidambaram (2007) .
28 For an analysis of India's success in software a But we want to turn now from these to the microeconomic foundations of politics can easily be dissipated, as we country's economic 'nuts and bolts' do the microeconomic institutions that pe role in an economy's long-run trajector
IV. Microeconomic foundations
India's initial focus on the international sector has paid off handsomely. But to this growth, microeconomic issues-better distribution of income, improved labo functioning, the control of corruption, and more efficient institutions for bus enterprise-need greater attention. These are often referred to as second-generatio There is no effort here to cover all these microfoundational issues, each of which the subject of a full-length paper, but we comment on one, namely, labour-market r where we have some insights to offer which are not common knowledge.
While the Indian economy is booming, there is evidence that workers are not p in the boom adequately. Employment is not growing as fast as working-age popul are wages rising as rapidly as per-capita income. There are many reasons for this do with forces of globalization that are beyond the Indian government's policy much of it has to do with the 'culture' that pervades India's labour markets, which a consequence of the complicated and ill-conceived laws that govern the labour m Most of India's labour laws were crafted with scant respect f seemed bad, the presumption was that you had simply to enact a that each law leads entrepreneurs and labourers to respond strate ways, was paid no heed. In a poor country no one with any sen But in today's globalized world, with volatile and shifting demand, firms have responded to this by keeping their labour force as small as possible. It is little wonder that in a country as large as India fewer than 10m workers are employed in the formal private sector. Some commentators have argued that India's labour laws could not have had much of a consequence since most of them apply only to the formal sector. What they fail to realize is that one reason the formal sector has remained minuscule is because of these laws and also the culture that these laws have spawned (Basu, 2006a) .
Several recent studies have analysed the impacts of labour regulations on firm productivity, patterns of specialization, and technological progress. According to Besley and Burgess (2004) , increasing pro-worker regulation has a negative impact on investment and productivity in the registered manufacturing sectors. What is also interesting about their findings is the lack of evidence that such policies improve labor interests. Aghion and Burgess (2003) confirm these results and in addition show that the negative impact of having stricter labour regulations on productivity has increased in the post-liberalization period. Kochar el al. (2006) , based on their analysis of the patterns of specialization of Indian firms, suggest that not only is the level of productivity of existing firms affected by stringent regulations, but new firms are also kept from entering as a result.
What is needed in India is not a law that allows employers to fire workers at will, but one that allows for different kinds of contracts. Some workers may sign a contract for a high wage, but one that requires them to quit at short notice; others may seek the opposite. This would allow firms to employ different kinds of labour depending on the volatility of the market they operate in.
Much of the debate on labour laws has been misconstrued. What is needed is not change in labour laws and policy to elicit sacrifice from organized labour, as some economists have suggested. Indian workers, whether they be in the organized sector or the unorganized sector, are too poor for that. The need is for changes in order to create greater private-sector demand for labour, which would boost wages and employment. We believe that India's poorly construed labour laws have been so persistent because of an intellectual failure--to wit, the inability to grasp that, in some able to waive some rights that have been In brief, the need is to move to a syst in the labour market, (ii) has a minima (iii) resolves labour-market disputes mo
V. Conclusion
To conclude, if India wants to sustain and raise even higher its curre bottlenecks in the Indian economy will need to be addressed. These are expensive freight rates, power supply, ports, and airports), labour and ban and the high level of corruption in the government bureaucracy. In erratic and low growth pattern of the agricultural sector, and the risin states, between rural and urban areas, and within urban and within ru the 1990s-are a concern.
Of these numerous factors, we have addressed only a few in this paper. Each of these factors deserves inquiry, research, and policy initiative, but in concluding we remark briefly on just one of them-the subject of inequality.
Comparing the ratio of the income shares of the richest 10 per cent over the poorest 10
per cent in India with other countries, one may be tempted to conclude that inequality in India is not abnormally high. According to the World Bank's World Development Indicators 2006, this ratio was 7.2 in India (in 2000), compared to 18.36 in China (in 2001 ), 48 in Guatemala (in 2002 , and 15.9 in the USA (in 2000). As such, India's current inequality seems to be low and comparable to some of the Western European nations. But one has to remember that a poor country will have a natural tendency for greater equality, since people cannot survive below a certain level of income. To take an extreme case, a country that has a per-capita income equal to the subsistence income will, by definition, have no income inequality. Hence, despite the seemingly encouraging inequality ratio mentioned above, inequality-especially when it results in higher poverty-is a serious problem for India. This could lead to political tensions and could destabilize the otherwise optimistic growth scenario. But, even if it does not dampen the country's growth prospects, it seems to
